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Introduction 
 Indian venture capital industry is now considered as one of the predominant players 
among South Asian countries. As India started emerging as a country which is considered as a 
hi-tech and global outsourcing center, Indian venture capital industry started looking up with 
new investment opportunities. New funds have opened their shop here in India and are 
continuing to bring in more and more funds.  
 Indian research on initial public offerings is sparse. Previous studies have highlighted the 
presence of significant underpricing in IPOs. Studies also review the aftermarket performance of 
these IPOs but the aspect of venture backed IPOs and certification was never studied before. The 
present study has attempted to study whether venture backed IPOs are different in terms of 
underpricing and does it indicate certification of quality by venture capitalists. 
 The study finds that underpricing is significantly less in venture backed IPOs and through 
econometric models it finds that the presence of venture capitalists on the board does signal 
quality of the IPO and therefore certify the IPO. Good lead managers generally understand the 
kind of value addition venture capitalists try to make to a firm they fund and they therefore 
attempt to market the IPO at a better price thus reducing underpricing.  
 One of the essential and logical purposes of venture capital business is to exit, ideally 
through an initial public offering (IPO). The reason for their preference for an IPO is not difficult 
to understand, and could be attributed to the higher valuation per share that a venture capitalist 
would get if they offer their stock to public when compared to valuation in any other form of 
exit.  
 Indian venture capital industry was dormant for a very long time. In spite of its existence 
for over two decades, its importance has been realized only recently. Favorable guidelines were 
instituted by the government to encourage venture capital finance in India in 1996 and several 
amendments were made in the policy to encourage venture capital investments. But after two 
decades of its existence one pertinent question one would ask is what the performance of this 
industry is. When we talk about performance one has to evaluate the nature of venture backed 
IPOs. 
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Venture backed initial public offerings (IPOs) are relatively less in number when 
compared to many non-venture backed IPOs, but many have gone public and many are in the 
process of going public. Investors‟ community has questions and they would like to know, how 
have these ventures fared in the capital markets in the past? Were these Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) risky? Were these IPOs any different when compared to a similar asset class? Also many 
Indian venture capitalists are really unsure about their exit strategy. The choice of an IPO, 
instead of a trade sale is often difficult to make because even they are unsure about the response 
they would receive from investors‟ community.  
The present study therefore attempts to answer whether venture backed IPOs are different 
from non venture backed IPOs. If they are indeed different from ordinary IPOs in terms of their 
returns and perform better than them, such performance can be attributed to venture capitalists 
participation in the venture‟s development. Thus the presence of venture capitalists on the board 
would signal quality and would act as a form of certification from venture capitalists. The 
present study would also attempt to understand what are the determinants of venture capitalists 
certification are through econometric models. 
The remaining sections are: Section Two reviews literature of studies conducted in other 
countries and in India on the subject. Section Three introduces the status of Indian venture 
capital industry. Section Four presents the methodology of the study and introduces the 
econometric models of the present study. Section Five discusses the results of the study and 
Section Six concludes the study with cues for further research. 
 
I. Review of Literature 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydquist (1994) have studied the phenomenon of underpricing in 
25 countries and have reported that underpricing is inevitable in IPOs. The extent of 
underpricing in different countries may vary, but almost every researcher would agree that 
underpricing is prevalent in all IPOs.  The reason offered by the theorists of IPO underpricing is 
asymmetric information. Baron (1982) attributes the same to adverse selection and moral hazard 
problem and suggests that investment bankers who act as the agents have superior knowledge 
about the IPOs market and underpricing happens because of conflict of interest between issuer 
and the investment banker.  Rock (1986) focuses on this aspect of informational asymmetry 
between informed and uninformed investors and relates the pricing of an IPO to „winner curse‟ 
faced by the uninformed investors.  Allen and Faulhaber (1989) explain the same by attributing 
the phenomenon of underpricing to signaling hypothesis, which happens when the high quality 
firms‟ initial owners retain more share with them and offer a portion of the holding at a lower 
price than their intrinsic value, which can be inferred by uninformed investor as a signal of 
quality. As the information contained in the signal is discounted by the investors the after-market 
share price would significantly increase and the initial owners can recoup the losses of 
underpricing by disposing of their stock at a higher price in the market.  
Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, Vetsuypens (1990) use a sample of 433 venture backed IPOs 
and 1123 non venture backed IPOs to find if there exist any difference in average initial returns. 
They find no significant difference between a venture backed IPO and non venture backed IPO. 
However in a multivariate econometric model controlled for size of the issue, standard deviation 
of initial return and underwriters dummy variable, they argue that underpricing reduces if 
venture capitalists have a larger equity participation before the IPO and if venture capitalists 
serve longer on the boards of the funded companies. Megginson and Weiss (1991) used a 
matched sample of 320 venture backed and 320 non-venture backed in terms of issue size and 
industry over a four year period and reported that the underpricing is significantly less for 
venture backed IPOs and finds the evidence for certification. Brav and Gompers (1997) have 
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used a variety of techniques to quantify the abnormal returns and have found that venture backed 
IPOs out perform the non-venture backed IPOs. 
Research pertaining to underpricing of IPOs is sparse in India. Ajay Shah (1995) used as 
many as seven regression equations to study the reasons for underpricing of IPOs in India. For 
the purpose he chose a large sample of 2056 IPOs during the period from Jan 1991 to May 1995. 
The study reports that large issues are less underpriced and small issues have larger underpricing. 
One of the major determinants of underpricing as reported by the study is listing delay, which is 
characteristic to Indian IPOs. Madoosudhanan et. al (1997) studied 1922 IPOs from 1992 to 1995 
and reported the extent of underpricing. More importantly they studied the aftermarket 
performance of many of these IPOs from the day of listing to three years. The study reports 
positive return even after three years and places an argument for the need for relaxing Securities 
Exchange Board of India‟s(SEBI) norms. However the aspect of underpricing and the role of  
venture capitalists on the board of a company going public has never been scrutinized in India. 
The paper attempts to examine and compare the level of underpricing in venture backed IPOs 
and non-venture backed IPOs.  
 
II.  The Venture Capital Experience in India 
The origin of venture capital in India can be traced back to the setting up of a Technology 
Development Fund in the year 1987 through the levy of a cess on all technology imports. The 
fund was managed by Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI).  The idea to have venture 
capital fund administered by IDBI was a failure. Out of Rs. 418.65 cr collected over a period 
from 1986 to 1996, the amount credited to IDBI venture capital division‟s account was only Rs. 
57.84 cr over the same period. IDBI never really paid much attention to these funds because the 
size of the fund was so meager that it could not be kept track of. 
The Government's decision to encourage knowledge-entrepreneurship through the 
promotion of venture capital industry was in the right spirit. But the policy guidelines framed in 
November 1988 proved to be highly restrictive. It only pictured the Government's caution in 
allowing private enterprises to flourish. The venture capital guidelines actually proved to be 
counter productive and never offered any encouragement to the local venture capitalists. For 
instance, there were no tax incentives for either the venture capitalists or investors in the venture 
capital guidelines. 
In 1996, the Finance Minister in his Budget speech repealed the November 1988 
guidelines and announced tax concession to the industry. Fresh guidelines were issued by the 
SEBI in 1996 and for the first time the guidelines recognized the importance of hands off 
regulation. Some of the recent amendments include the lifting of 40% ceiling on equity 
contribution to a single venture. Now a venture capital fund can have 100% of company equity 
to finance the project. In order to give a fillip to venture activity in India several committees 
were set up to identify lacunae in the policy guidelines. The recent Chandershekar‟s Committee 
(2000)which presented its report in the year 2000 came up with several changes to facilitate flow 
of foreign capital into India which the government has agreed to in principal. 
The formation of Indian Venture Capital Association (IVCA) is yet another development, 
which coordinates the activities of all the players. Over the last few years, it has become a strong 
pressure group and has called for several changes in the policy of the Government.  
 
II.a. Venture Capital Commitments 
Indian venture capital industry is now considered as one of the predominant players 
among South Asian countries. The industry underwent a major shift in focus. It is not one of 
those countries which offers lower-cost production alternatives, but is a hi-tech and global 
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outsourcing center. New funds have opened their shop here in India and are continuing to bring 
in more and more funds.  
The size of total funds committed to this industry was Rs.4918.9 millions in 1993. This 
figure rose up by 27 times to Rs.1, 35,053 million in 2000. Similarly the value of investment 
portfolio was Rs.3178.81 million in 1993 and it rose by about 23 times to Rs.72, 380 million in 
2000. As can be seen in Table 1 significant growth was registered during the period from 1998 to 
2000 where the growth in investment portfolio is more than 100% on a year on year basis.  One 
can also notice that the industry committed a large pool of resources but only about 50% of it 
was invested in various ventures leaving a significant portion uninvested. The reason is venture 
capitalists are unable to find good quality deal flow (Vinay Kumar A, et al. 2002). 
Venture capitalists grew more cautious in investing in new opportunities in 2001(IVCA 
Year Book, 2001). This trend is not unusual because a similar pattern can be observed in the 
international venture capital markets. Year 2001 witnessed a fall of 21.8 p.c. in disbursements 
when compared to previous year $907.58 millions investment in 101 new ventures. 
 
 II.b.  Stage Wise Investment 
The concern that the industry is changing gears and is shifting its focus to later stage 
investment opportunities cannot be ignored. A highly contrasting picture emerges if we compare 
the figures of 1993 with those of 2000. In 1993 the cumulative funds committed to seed stage 
was as much as the cumulative funds invested in later stage (See Table 2). The figures in the year 
2000 speak a different language altogether. Now the major share of funds stays invested in later 
stage (about 51%) and second comes the start up stage, which attracted 40% of the total fund 
invested. Seed stage appears to have few takers as the years rolled by. The reasons are once 
again lack of good quality deal flow in the early stage ventures and shift in risk preference of 
venture capitalists. Some venture capitalists are parking their funds in safer bets. 
Only a few venture capital companies seemed to be active in the year 2001. All stages of 
investment reported a decline when compared to 2000 with one exception i.e. early stage 
ventures indicating renewed interest back into this stage.  
 
III. Data and Methodology 
The data of venture backed IPOs was collected from various venture capitalists in India. 
Since there is no database in India on venture backed IPOs, venture capitalists were requested to 
disclose the names of the companies which went public from the funds they operated. Many 
venture capitalists shared their list of IPOs with me. The number of IPOs that formed part of the 
present study is 40 from among the 47 names we had. The study used various sources to collect 
information about these companies. Firstly I have used Center for Monitoring Indian Economy 
(CMIE) dataset of all the IPOs from 1989 to 2002. The dataset does not contain information 
about some companies on our list. Also, it was found to be an insufficient dataset in terms of 
information regarding the underwriters and other details required for the study. So I turned to 
getting the information from popular magazines in India namely Dalal Street and Capital 
Markets to gain requisite information about the companies on our list. Again we faced difficulty 
in getting information regarding some companies on our list even from these magazines. The 
time period of the study is June1992 to March 2001. 
In order to compare with the venture backed asset class we have chosen non-venture 
IPOs from the above mentioned sources in the similar manner for the same period. We had 62 
IPOs in this sample. A total of 102 companies formed the sample for the study. 
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III.a. Regression Models 
In order to understand whether venture capitalists make any difference on the board, I 
have studied the determinants of underpricing in India. Initial day returns could be influenced by 
factors such as the prevailing market condition, the venture capitalist acting as one of the board 
members, the ability of the firm to employ a good merchant banker, the technology of the firm, 
the size of the issue, the time the company would take to list on the stock exchange and the 
number of times the issues gets subscribed.. In India listing delay is phenomenal, it was as high 
as 1095 days in the present sample and as low as 45 days. The reason is previously the norms 
instituted were in sufficient with regard to listing delay. Even thought the present SEBI norms 
say that after the closing date of the issue the stock should be listed within 16 days (T+16, where 
T is the closing date) the listing delay still seems to be a sour issue in Indian primary markets. 
The following equation was employed for the purpose. 
 
Rit = β0+ β1MARKET+ β2VENT+ β3RANK+ β4LSIZE+ β5LDELAY+ β6TIMES + β7TECH-   
     (1) 
 
Where  
 Rit is the initial day raw return
1
  
 
β0 is the intercept 
 
β1 through β7 are model coefficients 
 
MARKET = the return on the market index for the similar period as the initial day 
returns used as proxy for market condition 
 
VENT is coded as 1 for companies with venture capitalist on the board and 0 
other wise 
 
RANK is coded as 1 for lead managers of issue, if they are among the top five 
during that period and 0 otherwise 
 
LSIZE is log of Issue size 
 
LDELAY is Log of number of days delay for listing 
 
TIMES is number of times the issue is subscribed 
 
TECH is coded as 1 for companies, if the sampled company is a technology 
companies and 0 otherwise 
 
 The a priori relationship of each of the above independent variables on the dependent 
variable can be stated as positive if the direction of movement is in one direction i.e. if they have 
direct relationship and negative they are inversely related. The variables which have a positive 
                                                 
1
 Initial day raw return are calculated as 
0
1 *100itit
i
P
R
P
 
  
 
, Where Pit  is closing price on the first day of 
trading and Pi0 is offer price 
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relationship with underpricing are MARKET, LDELAY, TECH and TIMES. The variable which 
are supposed to be negatively related are VENT, RANK, PREMIUM and LSIZE. The logic is 
simple prevailing market conditions directly effect underpricing, if the market returns are high 
then the underpricing will also be high because as investor expectations from one point in time to 
the other increase the expectations of the returns on the stock that went public will also increase. 
Delay in listing on the stock exchange may cause uncertainty in the price discovery process. The 
investors thus would like to see the stock listed at a higher price then the offer price 
compensating for the time loss. The technology of the firm going public is new then it again may 
cause uncertainty in the minds of investors, and may effect the price discovery process causing 
underpricing. The number of times an issue gets subscribed could also send a signal to the 
market that the offer price was too less and that is the reason why many investors have 
subscribed to the issue and listing price may go up because investors who take this cue that the 
issue is priced too less and could be taken advantage of may buy the issue on the first day of 
trading thus causing underpricing. 
 Good quality issues are not underpriced as compared to the bad quality counterparts. So 
underpricing is inversely related to venture backed IPOs, because they are good in quality. 
Venture capitalists generally bring value addition to the venture they fund and hence these firms 
are generally of high quality thus should be negatively related to underpricing. Again the public 
offer of firms of good quality are managed by reputed lead managers, because if the manage bad 
quality issues their reputation will be at stake. Since good quality IPOs price discovery is more 
efficient than the bad quality ones underpricing is less and lead managers help in the process of 
this price discovery. Thus reputed lead managers role is negatively related to underpricing. 
Premium issues are regulated by profitability and track record norms by SEBI hence firms which 
fulfill these norms may be of good quality and the offer document indicates the justification for 
the premium, thus premium issues may be less underpriced as compared to par issues suggesting 
an inverse relationship. Issue size may also play a role in pricing of the issue, the logic is bigger 
firms can afford offer bigger chunk of their shares to public. Since  bigger firms demonstrate 
their existences in terms of past profitability and future plans, their issues may not be 
underpriced as much, thus suggesting an inverse relationship with underpricing.  
A similar regression was also employed to test the effect of the above mentioned 
independent variables on the annualized initial returns
2
.  
The second set of regression equations were employed to understand whether venture 
backed company do better after listing. For the purpose all the above mentioned independent 
variables were used to study their influence on the returns after listing. Returns were calculated 
from the listing day to one month period after listing, two-month period and three month periods. 
The following equation was used for the purposes. 
 
MRit = β0+ β1MARKET+ β2VENT+ β3RANK+ β4LSIZE+ β5LDELAY+ β6TIMES + β7TECH-  
      (2) 
 
Where MRit is Monthly after market returns, the suffix t denotes number of months, in the 
present case one month, two month and three months. 
 Finally to understand the determinants of certification by venture capitalist as logistic 
regression was used of the form as depicted in equation number 3. Since variable VENT is a 
                                                 
2
 For the purpose of annualized return R it was multiplied by a factor of (365/ DELAY). Where DELAY is number 
of days elapsed before listing the issue on the stock exchange. 
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dichotomous variable logistic regression is appropriate for the purpose. The logistic regression 
estimates the odds ratio favoring VENT =1, that is odds of a company being venture backed. The 
logarithmic form of the odds ratio will give us the linear regression equation of the form shown 
in equation 3. 
The possible independent variables that have a bearing on certification of venture capitalist are 
the reputation of lead managers and good lead manager not being able to take up the task of 
managing the issue if they are not convinced about the quality of the issue. RANK is used as a 
proxy for reputation of the lead manager. After market returns should essentially differentiate 
venture backed firms from non venture backed firms, to proxy this aspect three months returns 
were used in the model. The technology of the firm should differentiate venture backed firm 
from a non venture backed firm, to proxy this aspect TECH variable was used and finally in 
order to study the influence of size on venture backed companies LSIZE was used in the model. 
 
Logit (VENT) = β0+ β1RANK+ β2MR1+ β3 MR2+ β4 MR3+ β5 TECH+ β6 LSIZE    
       (3) 
 
Where MR1, MR2, and MR3 are the return after one month, two month and three months of listing 
respectively from the first day of closing. 
 
 IV. Results 
The overall underpricing in Indian IPOs is about 120% which is consistent with earlier 
studies in India (See Table 3, Panel C). The returns in the months to follow seem to fall 
drastically, which is not reported in the studies previously conducted. Panel D of the table 
presents the underpricing of non-premium and premium issues. Premium issues are issues 
offered at a higher price than their face value, which is usually Rs.10 in India. In 1992 SEBI 
introduced free pricing of the issues in India. The underpricing for non-premium issues is very 
high at 203% whereas premium issues underpricing is at 49%. In terms of the monthly returns 
there is not much of any difference.    
From Table 3, Panel A, it is evident that the mean underpricing of venture backed IPOs is 
63.14%. Whereas the non-venture backed IPOs have an underpricing of as much as 157.64% 
(from Panel B), which is more than twice when compared to venture backed IPOs. The average 
returns of venture backed IPOs after listing for three months also seem to be better than the non-
venture backed IPOs. In month one after listing if the returns are 16% from venture backed IPOs, 
it is -16% for non-venture backed IPOs. The third month seems to be lower for both venture 
backed IPOs and non venture backed IPOs, but even here venture backed IPOs score a point by 
registering a marginally higher returns when compared to non-venture backed IPOs. The 
standard deviations for both asset classes, if we compare, again show a similar picture. The 
standard deviation of initial day returns for venture backed IPOs is 107.77 % where as it is 
580.61% for non venture backed IPOs, even though the standard deviation is high for venture 
backed IPOs representing the general nature of risk involved in this type of asset class, it is much 
better than the standard deviation of non venture backed IPOs. A similar trend is visible in the 
standard deviation of returns for a three month period. This strongly suggests that venture capital 
IPOs are different from their non venture backed counter parts. This also indicates that venture 
backed IPOs are superior to non-venture backed IPOs. In order to understand whether it is due to 
certification hypothesis, as cited earlier, I have used regression model discussed in the previous 
section. 
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IV.a. Regression on Initial day returns 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression as discussed in equation one from Section 4 
above. The dependent variable Rit stands for initial day returns and ARit stands for annualized 
initial day returns. The variables that have a significant„t‟ score for a model regressed on Rit are 
MARKET, LSIZE, TECH and LDELAY.  Both VENT and RANK are insignificant. The results 
of the analysis match the apriori sign mentioned in parentheses in Table 4 excepting one variable 
that is VENT. The initial day underpricing is explained by a linear relationship with prevailing 
market conditions, the delay an issue would take to list on the stock exchange and the risk of the 
technology involved. The initial day underpricing has an inverse relationship with the size of the 
issue.  The variables that contribute to underpricing as is evident from the analysis are market 
conditions, delay in listing and the technology of the issue. The larger the delay the larger is the 
underpricing likewise if the venture involves an unknown technology underpricing increases. 
Market conditions have significant bearing on the underpricing, if market returns are high initial 
day returns will also be higher and vice versa. The size of the issue has an inverse relationship 
indicating an increase in issues size reduces underpricing consistent with earlier studies.  Initial 
day underpricing is not explained by both VENT and RANK. This can be interpreted as, even 
though for VENT the apriori sign does not match, by having venture capitalists on board the 
IPOs underpricing does not increase. Likewise a good lead manager also does not contribute to 
the underpricing of the issue.  
When a similar regression is performed on the annualized initial day return the results 
sufficiently match with earlier regression on raw returns. The significant variable that explains 
the initial day underpricing in annualized term are, TIMES, LSIZE, MARKET. TECH is also at 
90% confidence interval. The reason why LDELAY does not come up as a significant variable is 
annualized returns are adjusted for delay. Again VENT, PREMIUM and RANK are insignificant 
suggesting that the venture capitalist on the board does not contribute to underpricing of the 
issue.  
From the above analysis it can perhaps be inferred that as venture capitalists backed firms 
are less underpriced, venture backed IPOs are certified by venture capitalists as superior firms 
when compared to non-venture backed firms. 
 
IV.b. Regression Monthly returns after listing 
Table 5 presents the results of equation number two, where the dependent variable of the 
model is the returns after one month, two months and three months from the first day of closing. 
The purpose of this regression is to see whether venture capital backed companies perform well 
after the listing. The regression on return of month two and three did not yield significant results, 
so the table only presents the results of return of month one after listing. The two variables that 
came out as significant are VENT and LDELAY, all other variables are insignificant. The apriori 
signs also match the results. The first month returns of venture backed IPOs are significantly 
high. That means all venture backed IPOs register positive first month returns. These returns 
however will be lowered if the delay in listing increases. The reason why other variables  came 
out as insignificant is they are already discounted for in the initial day closing price. 
From the above analysis it is evident that venture capital backed IPOs are high quality 
IPOs. To have a venture capitalist on the board could signal quality of the IPO. And that is the 
reason why the first month returns are high, after that the returns fall probably because of the 
increased supply of the stock from venture capitalists and other institutional investors in the 
market. 
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IV.c. Logistic Regression 
If venture backed IPOs are superior to non-venture backed IPOs and venture capitalists 
certify the quality then it is pertinent to understand what distinguishes venture backed IPOs from 
non-venture backed IPOs and what are the determinants of certification. For this purpose a 
logistic regression was employed. Since variable VENT is coded as a dichotomous variable 
employing OLS would seriously compromise on the assumptions of BLUE
3
, since it is a non 
linear variable. Therefore a form of non linear regression which involve maximum likelihood 
estimation was employed, which is performed in an iterative manner. The logic of the regression 
is whether the classification of cases into one or the other of the categories (i.e. one and zero in 
the present case), of the dependent variable can be predicted by independent variable instead of 
predicting arbitrary value for dependent variable through OLS (Menard, 2001).  
The model registered significant Wald Score on variables such as MR1, LSIZE and 
RANK as is evident from Panel A. The model fit is good because Hosmer and Lemeshow Test is 
insignificant as can be seen from Panel C of Table 6. The -2LL from Panel B is low again 
indicating a good fit for the model. This can be interpreted as,  the most distinguishing factors 
that separate venture backed IPOs from non-venture backed IPOs are the returns after listing, the 
size of the issue, and the rank of lead manager. Since venture capital companies are perceived as 
high quality by the lead managers they make efforts to manage the issue and therefore venture 
backed IPOs get a good response and better valuation as an offer price closer to the first day 
trading price. The venture backed IPOs, because of their superiority deliver expected results after 
listing.  
 
V. Conclusions and Further Research 
Indian research on initial public offerings is sparse. Previous studies have highlighted the 
presence of significant underpricing in IPOs. Studies also review the aftermarket performance of 
these IPOs but the aspect of venture backed IPOs and certification was never studied before. The 
present study has attempted to study whether venture backed IPOs are different in terms of 
underpricing and does it indicate certification of quality by venture capitalists. The study finds 
that underpricing is significantly less in venture backed IPOs and through econometric models it 
finds that the presence of venture capitalists on the board does signal quality of the IPO and 
therefore certify the IPO.  
The other aspect that was intended for this study was if venture capitalists could certify 
the, IPO what distinguishes venture backed IPOs from non-venture backed IPOs. For this 
purpose a logistic regression model was employed and the study finds that the determinants of 
certification are aftermarket returns, size of the issue and lead manager role. That means venture 
backed IPOs were managed by good lead managers and venture capitalists should always try and 
employ good lead mangers because good lead manager understand the importance of a venture 
capitalist and therefore they can market it better.  
The present study would dispel general attitude towards an IPO of a venture capitalists 
that they tend to perceive it as very risky and is fraught with dangers of failure. Good lead 
managers generally understand the kind of value addition venture capitalists try to make to a firm 
they fund and they therefore attempt market the firm at a better price thus reducing underpricing.  
Further research should concentrate on the long term performance of venture backed 
IPOs. The issue of percentage of ownership that venture capitalists would like to retain after the 
IPO could also be investigated as a potential signal. It would be interesting to evaluate whether 
                                                 
3
 BLUE stands for best linear unbiased estimation. 
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there is any conflict of interest between the underwriter and the venture capitalist, if so how such 
issues have to be addressed.  
  
103 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Ajay, Shah, (1995), “ The Indian IPO Market: Empirical Facts”, Working Paper Center for 
Monitoring Indian Economy, Mumbai. 
Allen, F. and G. Faulhaber, (1989), “Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO Market” Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 23, pp. 303-323. 
Asian Venture Capital Journal Annual Publication, 2001. 
Baron, D.,(1982), “A Model of the Demand of Investment Banking Advising and Distribution 
Services for New Issues” Journal of Finance,  Vol. 35, pp. 955-976. 
Barry, C., C. J. Muscarella, J. W. Peavy III, and M. R. Vetsuypens, (1990), “The Role of Venture 
Capital in the Creation of Public Companies”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 27, 
pp. 447-471. 
Brav, A., and P. Gompers, (1997), “Myth and Reality? The Long Run Underperformance of 
Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Non-Venture Capital Backed 
Companies” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 1791-1821. 
Chandershekar, (2000), “Chandershekar Committee Report on Venture Capital in India” SEBI. 
Indian Venture Capital Association (IVCA), (2001), “Venture Activity Report -1998”, pp. 3-7. 
Kumar, A. Vinay, Rahul Shah, and Kiran S. Nadkarni, (2002), “Venture Capital in India: The 
Present and The Future,” ICFAI Reader, November Issue, pp. 60-63. 
Loughran, T. Ritter, J. R. Rydqvist, (1994), “Initial Public Offerings: International Insights”, 
Journal of Pacific-Basin Finance, Vol. 2, pp. 165-199. 
Madhusoodhan, T.P., and T. Hirupalraju, (1997), “Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings: The 
Indian Evidence”, Vikalpa, Vol. 22, Issue 4, pp. 17-30. 
Megginson, W., and K. Weiss, (1991), “Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public 
Offerings”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 879-903. 
Menard, Scott, (2001), “Applied Logistic Regression Analysis 2e” Sage Publication Inc., 
California, p. 12. 
Rock, K., (1986), “Why News are Underpriced”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 
187-212. 
 
  
104
 
 
Table I 
Venture Capital Commitments 
 
 
(Rs./million) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999* 2000* 
Amount Invested  3173.81 4258.04 5724.55 6728.5 10000.4 12559.8 34905 72380 
No of Companies  
428 488 602 622 691 728 
 
- 
1213 
Amount 
Committed  
4918.92 6119.25 8281.00 14019.0 25595.1 29884.0 
 
79452 
135053 
Source: Complied from IVCA annual publications 
*Figures from AVCJ 2001 edition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II  
Stage Wise Investment 
 
 
Rs. Million 1993 2000
*
 2001
**
 
Seed 822.49 6514.2 1200 
Startup 1248.22 28952 1843.2 
Early 236.19 - 14126.4 
Later 838.45 36913.8 1281.6 
Turnaround 28.46 - - 
Source: Compiled from IVCA annual publications 
*Figures from AVCJ 2001 edition. 
** Figures from IVCA Year Book 2001, converted from dollars to Rs. 
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Table III 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
(%) 
Std. Deviation 
Panel A      
 VC Initial Returns 40 -85.71 550.00 63.1474 107.77881 
VC Return after month1 40 -62.35 126.13 16.0437 44.20501 
 VC Return after month 2 39 -37.50 42.50 -.3346 16.27757 
VC Return after month 3 39 -1.00 6.76 .3102 1.52643 
Panel B      
Non VC Initial Return 62 -97.50 3280.50 157.6489 580.61313 
Non-VC monthReturn1 62 -100.00 190.00 -16.2932 57.77012 
Non-VC month Return 2 62 -37.50 36.10 .3266 13.21345 
Non-VC month Return 3 62 -1.00 6.76 .1839 1.46045 
Panel C      
ALL Sample Initial 
Return 
10
2 
-97.50 3280.50 120.5895 458.51652 
ALL Sample month R1 10
2 
-100.00 190.00 -3.6121 54.97201 
ALL Sampler month R2 10
1 
-37.50 42.50 .0713 14.39765 
ALL Sample month R3 10
1 
-1.00 6.76 .2326 1.47996 
Panel D      
Initial Return to Non-
Premium Issues 
47 -30.00 3280.50 203.5780 660.24244 
Non-P month R1 47 -100.00 126.13 -12.1977 51.56471 
Non-P month R2 46 -37.50 36.10 2.3761 12.02102 
Non-P monthR3 46 -1.00 6.76 .2347 1.67279 
Premium Initial R 55 -97.50 550.00 49.6721 103.75801 
P month R1 55 -100.00 190.00 3.7248 57.16750 
P month R2 55 -37.50 42.50 -3.8309 15.42629 
P month R3 55 -1.00 3.89 -.0023 .84109 
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Table IV 
Regression on Initial day returns and annualized returns 
 
 
Variables ( Apriori Sign) Coefficient Sig Coefficient  Sig 
Dependent Variable Rit  ARit  
(Constant) -593.13 
(-1.694) 
.094 209.036 
(.440) 
.661 
VENT (-ve) 99.416 
(0.893) 
.375 175.199 
(1.159) 
.250 
TIMES (+ve) 1.555 
(0.935) 
.353 5.039 
(2.230) 
.028 
PREMIUM (-ve) -28.384 
(-0.260) 
.796 6.596 
(.044) 
.965 
RANK (-ve) -100.006 
(.0906) 
.367 -185.254 
(-1.237) 
.219 
TECH (+ve) 217.464 
(2.132) 
.036 225.892 
(1.632) 
.106 
LDELAY (+ve) 192.455 
(2.737) 
.008 88.441 
(.927) 
.357 
LSIZE (-ve) -139.987 
(-2.422) 
.018 -228.417 
(-2.911) 
.005 
MARKET (+ve) 7.179 
(3.363) 
.001 14.137 
(4.878) 
.000 
R
2 
 (Adjusted R
2
) 
 
0.284 
(0.218) 
 0.331 
(0.270) 
 
F 4.305 .000 5.393 .000 
Note: t statistic in parentheses  
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Table V 
Regression on the returns after listing 
 
 
Variables ( Apriori Sign) Coefficient Sig 
Dependent Variable MR1  
(Constant) 49.945 
(1.116) 
.268 
VENT (+ve) 31.584 
(2.1012) 
.047 
TIMES (-ve) 0.243 
(1.139) 
.258 
PREMIUM (-ve) -17.488 
(-1.267) 
.209 
RANK (+ve) -2.488 
(.154) 
.878 
LDELAY (-ve) -16.257 
(-1.788) 
.077 
LSIZE (+ve) 5.313 
(-.723) 
.472 
MARKET (+ve) .609 
(.838) 
.404 
R
2 
 (Adjusted R
2
) 
 
0.181 
(0.112) 
 
F 2.646 .016 
Note: t statistic in parentheses  
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Table VI  
Logistic Regression; Dependent Variable VENT 
 
Panel A  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 MR1 .015 .005 7.359 1 .007 1.015 
 MR2 -.014 .024 .365 1 .546 .986 
 MR3 .006 .251 .000 1 .982 1.006 
 LSIZE .132 .047 7.888 1 .005 1.141 
 TECH .329 .576 .326 1 .568 1.390 
 RANK 1.921 .653 8.649 1 .003 6.825 
 Constan
t 
-2.358 .560 17.708 1 .000 .095 
Panel B Model Summary 
 -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
 
 88.782 .356 .485  
Panel C Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
   Chi-
square 
df Sig.   
   4.534 8 .806   
 
 
